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INTRODUCTION 
Meet Pete.  Pete is an average, nondescript sports fan who works 
hard during the day and enjoys fantasy football.1  Pete does not have a 
law degree, and his only knowledge of the law behind fantasy sports 
comes from a segment he recently heard on ESPN, about Major League 
Baseball being sued over the right to use player names and statistics for 
fantasy baseball purposes.2  In response to this court decision, which 
seriously limited the ability of major sports leagues to license the 
statistics of their athletes, the National Football League (NFL) 
determined that it could make more money off of fantasy football by 
offering fantasy football participants an official “NFL Championship 
Package.”3  Pete learns that this package is available for download or on 
CD and includes various forms to help participants conduct their fantasy 
football draft and track their teams throughout the season.  
Additionally, Pete is interested in the sortable data collection of the 
athletes’ statistics from the last three seasons that is included with the 
Championship Package.  Strangely, the NFL’s Championship Package is 
completely devoid of any software; it consists solely of various files that 
contain the players’ information. 
Although Pete wants his fantasy football team to prevail this year, 
he feels the NFL’s price of $59.99 (not including tax or shipping and 
handling) is too steep.  Instead of purchasing the content online, Pete 
resorts to his favorite file-sharing software to download it.  But when 
Pete learns that he cannot view the content without a password, he 
downloads a program that will figure out the password and open the 
files without the NFL’s authorization.  Shortly after downloading the 
files, Pete receives a letter from the NFL threatening him with a lawsuit 
for violating its copyright in the Championship Package.  Fearing a 
protracted legal battle with the NFL, Pete capitulates and pays the NFL 
the $1000 it demands to avoid the suit. 
1. Fantasy sports is a multimillion dollar industry in which Pete (“owner”) “drafts” 
athletes from various professional sports teams.  In a given period of time (usually one week) 
the owners compete against other owners by comparing the statistics of their drafted athletes 
against those of the other owners.  C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball 
Advanced Media, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1080 (E.D. Mo. 2006). 
2. The case Pete heard about is C.B.C. Distributing & Marketing, Inc.  See generally id. 
(holding that the defendant was unable to prevent fantasy baseball providers from using the 
players’ names and statistics in its services). 
3. Although a brief visit to the NFL’s fantasy football website, http://www.nfl.com 
/fantasy (last visited Sept. 19, 2007), reveals that the NFL does have a market presence in the 
fantasy sports industry, the NFL’s appearance in this paper is purely hypothetical and all facts 
are devised by the author solely for the purpose of illustration. 
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Unfortunately for Pete, there was no way for him to know whether 
the NFL would actually bring suit, or even if it would succeed.  Of 
course, if Pete had contacted his attorney, he would have learned that 
the NFL’s claims were not nearly as strong as they stated in their letter.  
In fact, for reasons explained below, the forms and data collections were 
probably not copyrightable at all.  However, depending on where the 
NFL brought suit, Pete could be liable for claims under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) even though an infringement claim 
would likely fail. 
The Courts of Appeals are split in how they would handle Pete’s 
case.  Some would find liability under the DMCA, even though no 
infringement actually took place.  Others would likely hold that various 
copyright doctrines, like merger and scènes à faire (which are related to 
the idea/expression dichotomy), would eviscerate the NFL’s 
infringement claims, and therefore hold that a lack of protectable 
subject matter would foreclose the NFL’s DMCA claim altogether. 
Despite the theoretical nature of this scenario, a successful DMCA 
claim does not need to be supported by a valid infringement suit.4  To 
make matters worse, these claims place most of the burden on putative 
defendants5 who may have difficulty defending the action or raising a 
copyright misuse defense.6
This Comment will analyze the impending collision between the 
DMCA and the idea/expression dichotomy.  Part I will provide an 
overview of the relevant copyright fundamentals (including 
constitutional and statutory requirements, infringement, the 
idea/expression dichotomy, and relevant portions of the DMCA).  After 
establishing these basic copyright principles, this Comment will analyze 
the collision between the DMCA and the idea/expression dichotomy in 
Part II.  Finally, in Part III, this Comment will suggest that the tools 
necessary to resolve the circuit split and provide stability to this 
emerging aspect of the law already exist and should be widely 
implemented. 
I.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT FUNDAMENTALS 
Although this Comment does not depend upon an intricate 
knowledge of the history and evolution of copyright law throughout 
4. Jacqueline D. Lipton, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act and Interoperability, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487, 543 (2005). 
5. Id. at 492. 
6. Id. 
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American history, a handy understanding of basic principles will help 
the reader.  Accordingly, before delving into any specific arguments, 
this Part will discuss constitutional requirements for copyright 
protection, provide an overview of copyright infringement, and look at 
the relevant doctrines for excluding copyright protection.  Finally, this 
Part will close with a brief overview of the DMCA. 
A.  The Constitutional and Statutory Requirements of Copyright 
The federal government derives its authority to create and regulate 
copyright from the Constitution.  Article I vests Congress with the 
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”7  From this archaic grant 
of power, Congress has created the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-
1332.  Since the Copyright Act of 1790, copyright jurisprudence has 
evolved to recognize two fundamental constitutional requirements 
before copyright protection will attach to a work:  originality and 
fixation.8
The first, and until recently the most controversial, requirement for 
copyright protection is that of originality.  By statute, copyright only 
protects “original works of authorship.”9  Although this essential 
underpinning was greatly simplified in Feist Publications v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co.,10 originality plays an essential role in 
understanding the idea/expression dichotomy and the doctrines of 
merger and scènes à faire.  Justice O’Connor described originality as the 
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
8. See Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright at the Supreme Court: A Jurisprudence of 
Deference, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 317 (2000) (providing an in-depth analysis of the 
Court’s interpretation of the Copyright Act, beginning with the adoption of the IP Clause, 
extending through the holding of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 
U.S. 340 (1991), and ending with a prediction for the Court’s future forays into copyright 
law).  See also Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 689-99 
(2003) (advocating that evidentiary concerns also are through minimal copyright 
requirements). 
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).  See also Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 
910 n.10 (1980) (describing the inclusion of the statutorily mandated originality requirement). 
10. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359-60, 363 (1991) 
(repudiating the “sweat of the brow” doctrine as justifying copyright protection of works 
lacking a de minimus amount of originality).  Although some degree of originality has always 
been required for copyright protection, the Feist Court used relatively underutilized portions 
of previous case law to establish the modern concept of originality.  See Lichtman, supra note 
8, at 689-99. 
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“sine qua non” of copyright11 and ultimately recognized originality, and 
thus copyright, as “requir[ing] independent creation plus a modicum of 
creativity.”12  In doing so, the Court refused to extend copyright 
protection to a telephone directory and eliminated the popular “sweat 
of the brow” doctrine13 in favor of the originality requirement.14  Not 
surprisingly, Justice O’Connor’s “modicum of creativity” language has 
become an essential aspect of defining whether a work is “original.”  In 
addition to excising the “sweat of the brow” doctrine from American 
copyright jurisprudence, the Court reaffirmed the longstanding 
rationale for an originality requirement: 
The mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that 
every element of the work may be protected.  Originality 
remains the sine qua non of copyright; accordingly, copyright 
protection may extend only to those components of a work that 
are original to the author.  Thus, if the compilation author 
clothes facts with an original collocation of words, he or she may 
be able to claim a copyright in this written expression.  Others 
may copy the underlying facts from the publication, but not the 
precise words used to present them.15
In this way, originality serves a limited gate keeping function that 
prevents copyright from granting monopoly protection to authors over 
facts and ideas that are otherwise necessary to “promote Progress.”  In 
the hypothetical described at the beginning of this Comment, the NFL’s 
data collection of player statistics is analogous to the phone book in 
Feist in that any useful iteration of the data will render the collection 
non-original, and thus lacking the “creative spark” required for 
originality. 
In addition to originality, the Court has also established “fixation” as 
11. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
12. Id. at 346. 
13. The “sweat of the brow” doctrine has roots in an agrarian metaphor used to justify 
the extension of copyright protection to those works that, although lacking in originality, 
required great effort to create.  The metaphor likens the author’s work to that of a farmer 
who plants seeds, toils in the sun, and ultimately harvests a crop.  Under this reasoning, some 
foreign governments will grant protection to collections of information.  Patricia Loughlan, 
Pirates, Parasites, Reapers, Sowers, Fruits, Foxes . . . The Metaphors of Intellectual Property, 
28 SYDNEY L. REV. 211, 222 n.36 (2006). 
14. Feist, 499 U.S. at 364. 
15. Id. at 348 (internal citations omitted).  See also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1985) (balancing the public’s rights under the First 
Amendment against an individual copyright holder’s rights afforded by the Copyright Act); 
Lichtman, supra note 8, at 703; Hamilton, supra note 8, at 344. 
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a predicate for copyright protection.16  Although fixation as a 
requirement for protection seems rather obvious,17 its own evolution is 
as convoluted as that of originality, a fact exacerbated by the lag 
between technological innovation and legislative adaptation.18  In 
creating the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress finally sought to place the 
law ahead of technology by establishing fixation as “any tangible 
medium of expression, now known or later developed, . . . either directly 
or with the aid of a machine or device.”19  In this sense, fixation clearly 
applies to written words, but also applies to recorded sounds and even 
more transitory alternatives, such as a computer’s RAM.20  Accordingly, 
there should be no doubt that the NFL’s files are sufficiently fixed for 
the purposes of copyright. 
B.  Infringement 
The provisions governing infringement under the Copyright Act are 
found under Chapter Five, §§ 501-512.21  Infringement occurs when the 
defendant has “violate[d] any of the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner.”22  Generally speaking, these exclusive rights include 
unauthorized copying of the work, along with unauthorized distribution 
and performance.23  Accordingly, the courts have devised a standard 
format to prove that a defendant did in fact violate one of the plaintiff’s 
exclusive rights. 
Successful copyright infringement actions generally rely only upon 
the satisfaction of a two-part test created by the Supreme Court.24  First, 
the plaintiff must show the ownership of a valid copyright.25  Next, the 
aggrieved owner must show that the defendant’s work has copied 
original elements of the infringed work.26  As copyright plaintiffs know, 
however, the satisfaction of these elements is not always as easy as it 
16. Lichtman, supra note 8, at 718 (citing Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 
(1973)). 
17. A basic interpretation of “Writings” as referenced by the IP Clause very clearly 
establishes some type of tangibility of the work as a constitutional requirement. 
18. Lichtman, supra note 8, at 716-23. 
19. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
20. Lichtman, supra note 8, at 716-17. 
21. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-12 (2006). 
22. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006). 
23. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).  Section 501 refers to sections 106-21, but section 106 
delineates the owner’s exclusive rights. 
24. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
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may seem.  Although the first element can be satisfied by the 
presentation of a “timely obtained” Certificate of Registration from the 
U.S. Copyright Office,27 satisfying the second element is rarely as 
simple. 
The second element of copyright infringement, termed “actionable 
copying” by the Fifth Circuit,28 breaks down into two elements.  These 
include proof of “factual copying” and “substantial similarity.”29  It is 
the rare case that a copyright plaintiff has direct evidence of the 
defendant factually copying the infringed work.  When this direct 
evidence does not exist, courts will infer copying if the plaintiff can show 
that defendant 1) had access to the infringed work, and 2) “the accused 
work is substantially similar to the plaintiff’s” protected work.30  To 
further complicate matters, the “substantially similar” requirement of 
actionable copying differs from the “substantially similar” requirement 
of factual copying, giving rise to a reinvention of terms, as it were, by 
the Fifth Circuit.31  According to the Fifth Circuit, the term 
“substantially similar” only refers to the final comparison between the 
two works that will establish actionable copying.32  When a court looks 
to establish factual copying in the Fifth Circuit, access to the infringed 
work must be coupled with “probative similarity.”33  Because of the 
more precise nature of the Fifth Circuit’s terminology, this Comment 
will utilize these terms in lieu of the more traditional vocabulary.34
In Pete’s situation, the NFL can more than likely demonstrate actual 
copying by proving 1) that the files are on Pete’s computer, and 2) that 
Pete did not pay for them.  This situation differs from most infringement 
claims because the court will not have to decide if Pete created a work 
that infringes on the NFL’s rights.  Even though Pete may not have to 
worry about an actual test for substantial similarity, these various tests 
27. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 832 n.5 (10th Cir. 1993). 
28. Positive Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 367 (5th Cir. 
2004). 
29. Id. 
30. Incredible Techs., Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 2005). 
31. Positive Black Talk, 394 F.3d at 367. 
32. Id. at 368 n.7. 
33. Id. 
34. According to the Fifth Circuit, these terms have also been adopted by the First, 
Second, Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.  Id.  See, e.g., Dam Things From Den. v. Russ 
Berrie & Co., Inc., 290 F.3d 548, 562 (3d Cir. 2002); Transwestern Pub. Co. LP v. Multimedia 
Mktg. Assocs., Inc., 133 F.3d 773, 775 (10th Cir. 1998); Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, 
Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1997); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1541 (11th Cir. 
1996); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813 (1st Cir. 1995). 
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are important because, as will be discussed below, certain infringement 
tests predispose a court to find liability under the DMCA even when no 
infringement has taken place. 
Myriad tests have evolved among the various Courts of Appeals for 
determining “substantial similarity” between the protected and 
infringing works.  Because the focal point of this Comment resides at 
the intersection of copyright infringement and the DMCA, several of 
the more noteworthy tests are discussed below. 
1.  The Arnstein and Ordinary Observer Tests 
One of the earlier tests used by the courts was devised by the Second 
Circuit in Arnstein v. Porter.35  The basis of modern infringement 
jurisprudence can be clearly seen in this test as the court required proof 
not only of copying but also of improper appropriation.36  The copying 
prong can be proven with either an admission of copying by the 
defendant or with evidence of access.37  Only if copying is proven, 
should the court come to the question of “unlawful appropriation,” 
which is gauged by “the response of the ordinary lay hearer.”38  
Interestingly, while expert testimony and dissection may be considered 
in the first portion of the test, they are immaterial in the second portion 
of the test.39
The Arnstein test has evolved into the modern ordinary observer 
test, which is used in many circuits to determine “substantial 
similarity.”40  For instance, the First Circuit uses a version of the 
35. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). 
36. Id.at 468. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id.  See also Jeffrey Cadwell, Comment, Expert Testimony, Scènes à faire, and 
Tonal Music:  A (Not So) New Test for Infringement, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 137 (2005) 
(arguing for the use of expert testimony throughout an infringement trial). 
40. See, e.g. Incredible Techs., Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 
2005) (“The test for substantial similarity may itself be expressed in two parts:  whether the 
defendant copied from the plaintiff’s work and whether the copying, if proven, went so far as 
to constitute an improper appropriation.”) (citations omitted);  Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 
1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Two works are substantially similar if an average lay observer 
would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.”) 
(citation omitted);  Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 
2001) (“Whether there is substantial similarity between copyrightable expressions is 
determined by the ‘ordinary observer’ test.”);  Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 
541 (3d Cir. 1986) (“A finding of substantial similarity is an ad hoc determination.  We apply 
the reasonable person standard, under which ‘the test is whether the accused work is so 
similar to the plaintiff’s work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the 
defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s protectable expression by taking material of 
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ordinary observer test that mandates both dissection of the work41 and 
application of the doctrines of merger and scènes à faire.42  The D.C. 
Circuit adopted, in Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, a two-part test that 
is quite similar to the approach taken by the First Circuit.43  Under the 
Sturdza approach, a court first determines the protectable aspects of the 
plaintiff’s work and then compares these to the infringing work using 
the ordinary observer test.44  Alternatively, some circuits rely upon the 
“total concept and feel test.”45  This test is used to attach liability to 
infringers who copy a work that, although meriting protection as a 
whole, contains many elements that are not afforded copyright 
protection individually.  Finally, the Eleventh Circuit employs 
“fragmented literal similarity”46 and “comprehensive nonliteral 
similarity”47 as part of its ordinary observer test.48
2.  The Extrinsic/Intrinsic Test 
The extrinsic/intrinsic test parallels the “total concept and feel test” 
used primarily in the Second Circuit and very clearly has roots in the 
Arnstein test described above.49  Under this test for “substantial 
similarity,” a court considers two inquiries.50  The first portion of this 
substance and value.’”) (citation omitted). 
41. CMM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., 97 F.3d 1504, 1514 (1st Cir. 1996) 
(“[W]e note that the Copyright Act itself seems to mandate the ‘dissection’ of works into 
copyrightable and uncopyrightable elements.”). 
42. Yankee Candle Co., 259 F.3d at 34 (“[After dissection], we apply the doctrines of 
merger and scènes à faire to determine how ‘substantially similar’ the copy must be to 
infringe.”). 
43. Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1295-1300 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
44. Id. 
45. See, e.g., Matthews v. Freedman, 157 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1998); Knitwaves, Inc. v. 
Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003-04 (2d Cir. 1995). 
46. “In many cases an allegedly infringing work will evince ‘fragmented literal 
similarity.’  In other words, the work may copy only a small part of the copyrighted work, but 
do so word-for-word.  If this fragmented copy is important to the copyrighted work, and of 
sufficient quantity, then it may support a finding of substantial similarity.”  Palmer v. Braun, 
287 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][2] (2001)). 
47. “Nonliteral similarity is more difficult to define.  A work may be deemed 
substantially similar to another work when it evinces what Nimmer calls ‘comprehensive 
nonliteral similarity.’  This comprehensive nonliteral similarity is evident where ‘the 
fundamental essence or structure of one work is duplicated in another.’” Palmer, 287 F.3d at 
1330 (quoting 4 NIMMER § 13.03[A][1] (2001)). 
48. Palmer, 287 F.3d at 1330. 
49. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 
1164 (9th Cir. 1977). 
50. Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 315 F.3d 1039, 1043 (8th Cir. 2003) 
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test, the “extrinsic” portion, focuses on “specific expressive elements” 
including “plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and 
sequence of events.”51  If the plaintiff can demonstrate a material issue 
of triable fact at this juncture, then the defendant’s likely motion for 
summary judgment will be denied, and the case will be sent to a jury.52  
The intrinsic test parallels the ordinary observer test, in that, the inquiry 
focuses on whether “the works at issue are so dissimilar that ordinary 
‘reasonable minds cannot differ as to the absence of substantial 
similarity in expression.’”53  A jury cannot find substantial similarity 
without a sufficient evidentiary showing on both tests.54
3.  Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison 
In Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd.,55 the Tenth 
Circuit adopted the abstraction-filtration-comparison test as a primary 
method for analyzing infringement in cases dealing with computer 
programs.  As its name suggests, this test has three primary phases, 
appropriately named abstraction, filtration, and comparison—of which 
all are performed on the protected work.  The first phase of this test, the 
abstraction test, has its roots in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.56  In 
this incarnation of the test, the court is to “separate ideas from 
expression.”57  This portion of the test will not guide a court towards the 
(affirming the district court’s grant of the plaintiff’s preliminary injunction). 
51. Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(citation omitted) (affirming the district court’s finding of a lack of substantial similarity 
between the two works). 
52. Id. 
53. Taylor Corp., 315 F.3d at 1043 (citing Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 
117, 120 (8th Cir. 1987)). 
54. Id. 
55. 9 F.3d 823, 834-39 (10th Cir. 1993). 
56. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).  In this decision, the abstraction test was designed to 
determine that no infringement occurred even though two plays centered around a family 
feud between an Irish family and a Jewish family that is exacerbated by the marriage of two 
children and quelled by the birth of a grandchild.  Judge Hand described this test as follows: 
[W]hen the plagiarist does not take out a block in suit, but an abstract of the whole, 
decision is more troublesome.  Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great 
number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of 
the incident is left out.  The last may perhaps be no more than the most general 
statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but 
there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, 
since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his ‘ideas,’ to which, apart 
from their expression, his property is never extended. 
Id. at 121 (citation omitted). 
57. Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d at 834 (citation omitted). 
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protectable elements, but merely “divides the . . . program segments 
into layers of abstraction and determine whether the contents of that 
segment depict an idea, process or method.”58  Upon completion of 
abstraction, a court should proceed to the filtration phase, where it is to 
focus on the elimination of unprotectable elements, including those 
elements that are specified in § 102(b)59 or judicially-created, as in 
merger or scènes à faire.60  Ideally, this process will isolate those 
elements of the work that are protectable for comparison in the final 
phase, comparison.61  At this point, the court should compare the 
protectable elements against the infringing work and determine if they 
have been copied and if the copying “constitute[s] a substantial part of 
the original work.”62
C.  The Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Related Exclusionary Devices 
Common throughout all of the various tests for infringement 
described above is the assumption of protectable material.  As stated 
earlier, copyright protection does not extend to every element of a 
copyrighted work.  Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act specifically 
forbids the extension of copyright protection “to any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery.”63  Although each exception enumerated by the statute is 
worthy of mention, the dichotomy between ideas and expressions is 
especially relevant.  Generally, the idea/expression dichotomy is 
invoked to prevent an author from gaining a monopoly over an idea, the 
antithesis of copyright protection.64  The courts have delineated two 
other doctrines essential to guarding the boundaries between ideas and 
expressions. 
1.  The Merger Doctrine 
As seen in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., ideas by themselves 
58. Computer Mgmt. Assistance Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 401 (5th 
Cir. 2000). 
59. These include “idea[s], procedure[s], process[es], system[s], method[s] of operation, 
concept[s], principle[s], [and] discover[ies].” 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
60. Computer Mgmt. Assistance, 220 F.3d at 401. 
61. Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d at 838-39. 
62. Id. at 839. 
63. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
64. “Congress shall have Power To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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are not protected by copyright,65 and when the idea intertwines with the 
expression such that it is impossible to separate them, the expression is 
said to have “merged” with the idea.66  The necessity of the merger 
doctrine was first observed in the late 1960s by the First Circuit in 
Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co.67  Merger arises when “the topic 
necessarily requires, if not only one form of expression, at best only a 
limited number, to permit copyrighting would mean that a party or 
parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all 
possibilities of future use of the substance.”68
In Morrissey, the court was faced with two parties who each claimed 
rights in a set of rules for a contest.69  Of course, the challenges in a case 
like this lie in both the application of the law to the facts at issue and the 
policy concerns that develop from overprotection and underprotection.  
A court in this position faces two choices: (1) protect the senior user’s 
“expression” and require subsequent authors to reinvent rules for 
contests, or (2) declare that the senior user’s expressions were so 
fundamentally tied to the ideas that protection could not be extended.70  
The Morrissey court recognized the impossible nature of the first option 
and established the merger doctrine.71
Returning to Pete and the NFL, the merger doctrine prevents 
copyright protection from attaching to any individual record within the 
NFL’s data collection.  Furthermore, even if the data collection were 
able to receive protection as a whole, the information would itself be 
unprotectable, and if Pete could show the court that the statistics (ideas 
and facts) could not be expressed in any other way than the data 
records, then the merger doctrine would operate to render the NFL’s 
collection unprotectable. 
However, determining whether an idea and its expression have 
merged requires “considerable care” on the part of the courts because 
too liberal an application of the doctrine can result in underprotection 
while too sparing an application could end in overprotection.72  While 
65. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.).  See 
supra note 56. 
66. Lichtman, supra note 8, at 735. 
67. Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967). 
68. Id. at 678. 
69. Id. at 676. 
70. See Lichtman, supra note 8, at 735-36. 
71. Morrissey, 379 F.2d at 678 (“We cannot recognize copyright as a game of chess in 
which the public can be checkmated.”). 
72. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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the doctrine itself is fairly well settled, its application is not without 
controversy, as seen below.73
2.  Scènes à Faire 
The doctrine of scènes à faire has its roots both in the 
idea/expression dichotomy and the fundamental copyright requirement 
of originality.  This doctrine was first recognized in Schwartz v. 
Universal Pictures Co.,74 where the court imported this French phrase—
which literally means “scenes which ‘must’ be done,”—to prevent a 
finding of infringement “merely because both [parties] made use of an 
old situation.”75  In a more modern setting, the Seventh Circuit has 
interpreted scènes à faire to mean that infringement will not be found on 
the basis of elements that are so “rudimentary, commonplace, standard, 
or unavoidable that they do not serve to distinguish one work within a 
class of works from another.”76
Instead of foreclosing expression per se, as merger does, scènes à 
faire is rooted in the public domain and has been traditionally based 
upon “expression through similarities of treatment, details, scenes, 
events and characterization.”77  In Gaiman v. McFarlane, the Seventh 
Circuit considered scènes à faire as it applied to an “unexpectedly 
knowledgeable old wino” in the plaintiff’s work.78  Even though a 
character like this would not normally be copyrightable, the court 
afforded protection because the plaintiff had provided sufficient literary 
detail for the character to acquire a “distinctive” nature.79  Although 
Judge Posner used the word “distinctive,” the key to the wino’s 
protection rested in the author’s ability to differentiate this wino from 
the public domain wino by imbuing the character with sufficient 
originality so as to merit copyright protection.  Gaiman’s wino contrasts 
nicely with this Comment’s nondescript Pete.  By utilizing only 
minimally descriptive techniques, the author has relied on the reader to 
use stereotypical sports fan qualities to “flesh out” Pete’s details.  
73. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 557 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(Feikens, J., dissenting) (discussing the growing circuit split and advocating that the Sixth 
Circuit join the Second and Ninth Circuits in its approach). 
74. 85 F. Supp 270 (S.D. Cal. 1945). 
75. Id. at 275. 
76. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bucklew v. 
Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
77. Reyher v. Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976). 
78. Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 660. 
79. Id. 
  
144  MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:1 
 
 
Whereas the wino was afforded protection for being sufficiently 
distinctive, Pete possesses no details that differentiate him from the 
stereotypical sports fan.  Therefore, Pete is not sufficiently original and 
the author will not likely be able to protect Pete using copyright law. 
In traditional media, scènes à faire refers to treatments of characters, 
plots, or other elements that are so basic as to be considered 
“indispensable.”80 However, as copyright has been expanded to 
computer programs, this doctrine now applies to programming elements 
that are necessitated by hardware and mechanical restrictions.81  
Because of their involuntary or even mandatory nature, elements that 
qualify as scènes à faire are not afforded any protection under copyright. 
D.  The DMCA 
Congress incorporated the DMCA into the Copyright Act in 1998 
for two primary reasons.  First, the DMCA was perceived as required 
for compliance with the United States’ World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty82 obligations.83  Additionally, 
Congress was lobbied by the various entertainment industries to 
promulgate the DMCA in order to bulk up their rights in digital 
media.84  The effect of this legislation has been to provide copyright 
owners with an additional cause of action if an infringer bypasses a 
“technological measure” in order to infringe on the owner’s copyright.85
The DMCA provides this protection through three primary 
80. Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 
1982). 
If a drunken old bum were a copyrightable character, so would be a drunken 
suburban housewife, a gesticulating Frenchman, a fire-breathing dragon, a talking 
cat, a Prussian officer who wears a monocle and clicks his heels, a masked magician, 
and . . . a riotous knight who kept wassail to the discomfort of the household, or a 
vain and foppish steward who became amorous of his mistress.  It would be difficult 
to write successful works of fiction without negotiating for dozens or hundreds of 
copyright licenses, even though such stereotyped characters are the products not of 
the creative imagination but of simple observation of the human comedy. 
Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 660 (citations omitted). 
81. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir. 1993).  
The Third Circuit refers to this specific application of scènes à faire as “the doctrine of 
externalities.”  Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 
197, 214 (3rd Cir. 2002). 
82. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65 
(1997). 
83. Marcus Howell, Note, The Misapplication of the DMCA to the Aftermarket, 11 
B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 128, 139 (2005). 
84. Lipton, supra note 4, at 493. 
85. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 435 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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methods.  While the first line of defense prohibits any person from 
“circumvent[ing] a technological measure” in order to gain access to a 
protected work,86 the other two limitations ban “trafficking” of anti-
circumvention measures.87  The two anti-trafficking provisions are 
surprisingly similar on a textual level, but they each protect a distinct 
aspect of anti-circumvention technology. On the one hand, §1201(a)(2) 
protects “technological measure[s] that effectively control access to a 
[copyrighted] work.”88  On the other hand, § 1201(b)(1) protects 
“technologies designed to permit access to a work but prevent[ing] 
copying of the work or some other act that infringes a copyright.”89
Although the robust protection that the DMCA offers has enabled 
copyright holders to expand their sales to the digital world (i.e., the 
Internet), the DMCA is not without its critics.  First, plaintiffs suing 
under the DMCA need not show that there is a valid copyright 
infringement claim underlying the DMCA claim.90  This has led to 
manufacturers stifling competition by threatening costly lawsuits91 and 
has some commentators contemplating whether the archaic copyright 
misuse doctrine should be invoked.92
II.  WHAT DO WE DO WITH A DOCTRINE LIKE MERGER? 
The doctrines of merger and scènes à faire generally play important 
roles in preserving Congress’s constitutional mandates.93  Accordingly, 
any encroachment into this territory should be accepted only after 
careful and skeptical consideration.  As indicated above, one such 
putative invasion has risen in a seemingly innocuous form: the DMCA.94  
To be certain, the collision that this Comment foresees is not centered 
86. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2006); Corley, 273 F.3d at 435. 
87. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2), (b)(1) (2006); Corley, 273 F.3d at 435. 
88. 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(2) (2006); Corley, 273 F.3d at 441 (emphasis added). 
89. Corley, 273 F.3d at 441 (discussing the protections afforded by 17 U.S.C. § 
1201(b)(1)). 
90. Lipton, supra note 4, at 544. 
91. Howell, supra note 83, at 152. 
92. “Misuse is an equitable doctrine, with roots in the patent world, in which a 
defendant in an infringement action may prevail if he can show, as a defense, that the patent 
owner has attempted to extend his patent into areas not protected by the governmental 
grant.”  Heather, A. Sapp, Note, Garage Door Openers and Toner Cartridges:  Why Congress 
Should Revisit the Anti-Circumvention Provisions of the DMCA, 3 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 
135, 159 (2006). 
93. This includes not only the preamble to the IP Clause (“to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts”), U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, but also the restrictions placed upon 
the regulation of free speech preserved by the First Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
94. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05 (2006). 
  
146  MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:1 
 
 
on the DMCA exclusively, but on the intersection of that Act with the 
judicial doctrines of merger and scènes à faire.  To be even more precise, 
it is only the methods in which a few circuits are approaching this 
intersection that are troublesome. 
A.  The DMCA and Its Collision with the Idea/Expression Dichotomy 
What this all boils down to is that when the merger and scènes à faire 
doctrines interact with any type of anti-circumvention protocol designed 
to protect copyrightable material, certain applications of the doctrines 
create liability under the DMCA even where there is no liability under 
traditional infringement statutes.  The federal Courts of Appeals are 
currently split over when to apply the merger and scènes à faire 
doctrines—before or after infringement analysis.95  For the most part, 
this detail of the infringement analysis has remained a curio of copyright 
law, but when the DMCA enters the picture, this seemingly minute 
detail makes all the difference in the world. 
1.  Merger and Scènes à Faire as Affirmative Defenses to Copyright 
Liability 
Despite courts’ general reliance on the axiom that an idea cannot be 
copyrighted, a few commentators maintain that despite the language of 
§ 102(b), copyright protection is properly extended to unprotectable 
elements while the idea/expression dichotomy (and the various related 
doctrines) merely serves as a defense to liability.96  Courts relegate the 
merger and scènes à faire doctrines to the realm of affirmative defenses 
for a few primary reasons.97  First, some courts argue that predicating 
copyrightability on these doctrines will actually invalidate copyright law 
somehow.98  Alternatively, circuits that utilize the extrinsic/intrinsic or 
“total look and concept” tests for substantial similarity (e.g., the Second 
and Ninth Circuits) are more prone to apply merger and scènes à faire as 
affirmative defenses.99
The Second Circuit seems to be the strongest judicial advocate for 
95. Jacqueline D. Lipton, IP’s Problem Child:  Shifting the Paradigms for Software 
Protection, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 205, 213 n.46 (2006). 
96. 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 2.03[D] 
(2007). 
97. For the purposes of this Comment, this argument will be referenced as the 
“affirmative defense” approach. 
98. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705-06 (2d Cir. 1991). 
99. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 387 F.3d 522, 557-59 (6th Cir. 
2004) (Feikins, J., dissenting). 
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the extreme position that the “misapplication” of the merger and scènes 
à faire doctrines somehow act to invalidate copyright.  In Kregos v. 
Associated Press, the plaintiff created, and registered with the Copyright 
Office, a form that was used to publish pitching statistics in baseball 
games.100  When the AP published a form that was nearly identical, 
Kregos filed suit in the Southern District of New York, where the court 
granted the AP’s summary judgment motion.101  On review, the Court of 
Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision holding that the Second 
Circuit “consider[s] [the] so-called ‘merger’ doctrine in determining 
whether actionable infringement has occurred, rather than whether a 
copyright is valid.”102  In coming to this holding, the Second Circuit 
argued that an examination of merger in this light would allow for a 
“more detailed and realistic basis for evaluating the claim.”103  The court 
also felt that when merger is applied to prevent copyrightability (or as 
the court claimed, copyright invalidity), there is a danger of over or 
underprotection of copyrighted works.104
Alternatively, courts that apply the “total look and concept test” 
argue that merger and scènes à faire should only be applied as 
affirmative defenses.  The Second Circuit suggests that “courts may lose 
sight of the forest for the trees [b]y factoring out similarities based on 
non-copyrightable elements.”105  Along similar lines, in applying the 
intrinsic/extrinsic test, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits also argue that the 
affirmative defense line of reasoning is essential to protecting the work 
as a whole.  Finally, the Seventh Circuit is also concerned with 
protecting the author who relies on utilizing “nonprotectable” scènes à 
faire themes in her works.106
2.  Applying Merger and Scènes à Faire at the Threshold of Copyright 
The alternative application of the merger and scènes à faire doctrines 
occurs before infringement is even determined, so as to prevent 
copyright from ever attaching.107  Proponents of this application rely 
100. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 702. 
101. Id. at 703. 
102. Id. at 705. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980). 
106. Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 77 F.3d 909, 914 (7th Cir. 1996). 
107. Because this argument applies the idea/expression dichotomy (and related 
doctrines) at the outset of the copyright determination, this Comment will refer to the 
argument as the “threshold” approach. 
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principally on the text of the Copyright Act and the landmark decision 
Baker v. Selden.108  The argument, simplistic in its design, centers on the 
fact that § 102(b) of the Copyright Act prevents copyright protection. 
The language in question provides that “[i]n no case does copyright 
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea.”109  As 
the Fifth Circuit held in Kern River: 
When the “idea” and its “expression” are thus inseparable, 
copying the “expression” will not be barred, since protecting the 
“expression” in such circumstances would confer a monopoly of 
the “idea” upon the copyright owner free of the conditions and 
limitations imposed by the patent law.110
This rationale underpins the very reasoning for using the merger 
doctrine.  Furthermore, as the Court noted in Baker v. Selden, giving an 
author monopoly rights in the ideas she expresses works “a fraud upon 
the public.”111
B.  Lexmark International v. Static Control Components112
Lexmark International, Inc. (Lexmark) is a manufacturer of printers 
and ink cartridges that brought suit against Static Control Components 
(SCC), a manufacturer of microchips.113  Lexmark’s action was based on 
SCC’s duplication of programs Lexmark used in its ink cartridges to 
calculate toner level, which included a “Toner Loading Program” 
(TLP).114  In selling its printers, Lexmark created a classification of 
“Prebate” cartridges, which were sold to the consumer, but carried a 
contractual provision that required the consumer to use the cartridge 
just once and return it to Lexmark where it could be refilled.115  Without 
this type of system, it is common for these cartridges to be refilled by a 
third party and reused.116  Lexmark enforced the prebate agreement by 
installing a microchip on the printer that functioned like a “lock” and a 
108. 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1890) (holding that blank accounting forms are ideas in and of 
themselves, and therefore not entitled to copyright protection). 
109. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
110. Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1463 (5th  Cir. 
1990) (quoting Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 
1971) (citing Baker, 101 U.S. at 103)). 
111. 101 U.S. at 102. 
112. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 
2004). 
113. Id. at 529. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 530. 
116. Id. 
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separate microchip on the cartridge that functioned like a “key.”117  This 
system was designed so that users would only be able to use cartridges 
sold by Lexmark with Lexmark printers.  However, SCC manufactured 
and sold a microchip (SMARTEK) to generic ink cartridge 
manufacturers that was not only designed to function like the “key” 
microchip in Lexmark’s cartridges, but also carried Lexmark’s TLP.118  
Lexmark, believing its printer programs to be protected by copyright, 
filed suit alleging copyright infringement and violations of the DMCA’s 
anti-circumvention provisions.119
Although the district court found SCC liable on all counts, the Sixth 
Circuit reversed.120 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that Lexmark’s security 
protocol (the proverbial lock and key) was essentially a “lock-out code” 
to which copyright protection was denied by the doctrines of merger 
and scènes à faire.121  Furthermore, because of the hardware constraints 
on the TLP, it was also considered nonprotectable because it constituted 
a scènes à faire element.122  The court went on to determine that because 
the Printer Engine Program (PEP) on the cartridge was accessible 
without bypassing the security protocol, the DMCA was not 
implicated.123  The court likened Lexmark’s “security protocol” to a 
house where the back door was locked but the front door was left 
open.124
However, the Sixth Circuit’s holding was qualified by all manner of 
provisos and caveats.  First, the Sixth Circuit was only overturning a 
decision to grant a preliminary injunction; the court was careful to allow 
the District Court sufficient latitude on remand.125  Furthermore, as 
noted above, the Lexmark decision evades the DMCA issues, and this 
opinion actually provides a recipe for holders who wish to use the 
DMCA to protect unprotectable material.126  They need only utilize 
“[t]he combination of a powerful technological lock and contractual 
license terms forbidding purchases to access relevant code [to] create a 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 531. 
120. Id. at 551. 
121. Id. at 542. 
122. Id. at 544. 
123. The mere act of purchasing a Lexmark printer allowed the user to lawfully access 
the protected software.  Id. at 546-47. 
124. Id. at 547. 
125. Lipton, supra note 4, at 509. 
126. Id. at 506. 
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situation where . . . Lexmark would not apply.”127
III.  HARMONIZING THE INTERACTION 
Although the debate surrounding the application of merger and 
scènes à faire has been primarily a scholarly one up until now, as 
evidenced in Lexmark, copyright owners’ increasing reliance upon 
technology-based protection of their works necessarily implicates a 
greater number of DMCA-based claims.  Furthermore, that a defendant 
could be found liable under the DMCA even if there was no copyright 
infringement runs contrary to Congress’s intent.128  Of course, some 
circuits have already adopted the approach necessary to prevent this 
bewildering liability.  The Fifth Circuit, for example, expressly chose 
such a position in Mason v. Montgomery Data Inc.129 in accordance with 
its Kern River decision.130
The logic behind the threshold option is overwhelming.  In addition 
to actually complying with the basic constitutional and statutory 
constraints of copyright, which the affirmative defense option does not, 
the threshold option more accurately reflects the legislative intent of the 
DMCA.  Furthermore, the threshold option avoids the confusing legal 
fictions that the affirmative defense option creates. 
Applying the doctrines of merger and scènes à faire as affirmative 
defenses undermines the constitutional underpinnings of copyright.  As 
stated above, the Feist Court confirmed that originality is the “sine qua 
non of copyright.”131  With a doctrine like scènes à faire, which is at least 
partly justified as preventing unoriginal ideas from receiving copyright 
protection, this fundamental concept directly prevents copyright from 
attaching in the first place.  This certainly explains why the Second 
Circuit, a staunch advocate for the affirmative defense application of 
merger, stated that “scènes à faire are not copyrightable as a matter of 
law.”132  Furthermore, because facts “may not be copyrighted and are 
part of the public domain available to every person,”133  Feist also 
prevents copyright from attaching to “merged” expression when the 
127. Id. 
128. Howell, supra note 83, at 152. 
129. 967 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1992). 
130. Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458 (5th Cir. 1990). 
131. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
132. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying 
scènes à faire in justifying its refusal to extend copyright protection to “standard literary 
devices”). 
133. Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 (citation omitted). 
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involved “ideas” are facts.  Proponents of the affirmative defense 
position will argue that this leaves a gap for merged opinions and 
fictions—those ideas that are not facts, but still merge with their 
expression.134  As the Second Circuit correctly noted in Castle Rock 
Entertainment v. Carol Publishing Group Inc., in many circumstances, 
these opinions or fictions will more closely resemble expression than 
anything else—in which case merger is not applicable anyway.135
The idea/expression dichotomy prevents authors from obtaining and 
maintaining monopolies over information.136  As stated above, this goal 
is clearly articulated by § 102(b):  “In no case does copyright protection 
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or 
embodied in such work.”137
There is a valid argument that the affirmative defense approach to 
the application of merger and scènes à faire is also justified by the 
reading of the statute.  After all, the text does not deny copyright, but 
copyright protection.  Logically then, as the argument goes, Congress’s 
decision to only deny copyright protection tacitly stands for the 
proposition that Congress did not mean to deny copyright entirely.  
Therefore, the only method by which the courts can accurately reflect 
this distinction is by denying protection to unprotectable elements while 
maintaining protection in the work as a whole. 
This argument, however, is deceiving for several reasons.  Taking the 
constitutional argument into account, it is impossible for Congress to 
statutorily regulate outside of the scope that the Constitution allows.138  
But beyond the constitutional limits, this argument creates a unique 
134. But see Castle Rock Entm't v. Carol Publ’g Group Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 138-39 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (refuting the defendant’s contention that trivia derived from a television show’s 
fictitious storylines do not constitute “facts,” but protectable expression). 
135. Id. 
136. Morrisey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967). 
137. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
138. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176-77 (1803).  As the Court famously stated: 
The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not 
be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.  To what purpose are powers 
limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits 
may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?  The distinction, 
between a government with limited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those 
limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited 
and acts allowed, are of equal obligation. 
Id. 
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judicial paradox: “a court which finds that merger exists should hold 
that the two works in questions are not ‘substantially similar,’ even 
where they are in fact identical, a result which I view as a not useful 
variety of doublespeak.”139  It seems, then, that this judicial doublespeak 
is tailored expressly to create liability where none should normally 
exist.140
Furthermore, Congress’s intent in enacting the DCMA was not to 
create additional liability by significantly altering the contours of 
copyright law.  As stated above, Congress envisioned the DMCA to 
combat copyright piracy141 and as satisfying U.S. treaty obligations.142 
Allowing copyright holders to successfully bring claims under the 
auspices of the DMCA when none of their exclusive copyrights have 
been violated certainly does not comply with either of these stated aims. 
Finally, under the Lexmark majority’s holding, another interesting 
approach is engendered that ultimately supports the threshold 
approach.  Under the Sixth Circuit’s approach in Lexmark, the circuit 
split is immaterial because parallel terminology is used in the relevant 
statutes.  A literal reading of § 102(b) only affords copyright protection 
to those elements of a work on the expression side of the 
idea/expression dichotomy.  The DMCA specifically only applies to 
those works that are protected by the Copyright Act.143  Therefore, a 
work denied copyright protection by § 102(b) of the Copyright Act 
should also be denied protection under the DMCA.  Accordingly, a very 
literal reading of both statutes, such as that one taken by the Sixth 
Circuit, renders the whole discussion quite one-sided, and the circuit 
split obsolete. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts have created several doctrines to enforce the idea/expression 
dichotomy, including merger and scènes à faire.  Up until 1998, this 
139. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 715 (2d Cir. 1991) (Sweet, J., dissenting) 
(footnote omitted). 
140. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 558 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (Feikens, J., dissenting).  “I would hold that in cases where the merger is with a 
method of operation, the merger doctrine should be applied as a defense to infringement 
only, and not as informing the question of copyrightability.”  Id.  Note that under this 
approach, merger would preclude copyrightability under all other circumstance but be 
modified just for this case so that liability would attach. 
141. Lipton, supra note 4, at 493. 
142. Howell, supra note 83, at 138-39. 
143. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2006). 
  
2008] THE DMCA AND THE IDEA/EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY  153 
 
 
discourse has been more or less scholarly in its approach, but when 
Congress enacted the DMCA the realm of protectable works and their 
constituent elements began to play a much more important role.  It is 
now possible for copyright holders to receive damages from an 
“infringing” defendant even when no copyright infringement has 
occurred.  However, the arguments that support this putative liability 
lack proper constitutional, statutory, and logical support.  Therefore, 
courts should ignore any doctrine that purports to protect unprotectable 
works and refuse to ascribe liability to defendants who have not violated 
any copyright laws. 
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